



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

IS THE PAPACY AN OBSTACLE TO THE REUNION OF CHRISTENDOM?

BY THE MOST REV. JOHN IRELAND, ARCHBISHOP OF ST. PAUL.

Is the Papacy an obstacle to the reunion of Christendom? The answer given by Professor Charles A. Briggs is: No, if we have in mind the "ideal Papacy"; yes, if we have in mind "the real Papacy." I refer to the Professor's article in the mid-February number of *THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW*.

The "ideal Papacy," as the Professor explains himself, is the Papacy of the New Testament and of the early ages of the Christian Church; the "real Papacy" is the practical working Papacy of later ages grown in power far beyond the intent of the Founder of the Church, and putting forth claims to which its original commission gives no title or justification. The Professor demands that the Papacy divest itself of all developments and accretions, making itself again the Papacy "as near to Christ as St. Peter was, and as truly representative of the Lord and Master"; and, in this manner, open the portals of its temple to many, in other bodies of Christendom, now separated from it, who pray earnestly, as Christ prayed, that all "may be one," and willingly confess that unity among the followers of the Saviour implies the recognition of the "ideal Papacy" instituted by Christ and delegated to Peter and his successors.

The charge is grave, that the Papacy, through its own fault, through ambition and lust of domination, compels believers of the Gospel to hold themselves aloof from it, thus making necessary, for the time being at least, the divisions of Christendom, and voluntarily setting at naught the prayer of its Founder. Christ, undoubtedly, willed unity among His disciples. To disrupt Christian unity, to build up obstacles to the healing of the breach, when, from one cause or another, unity has been dis-

rupted, is the crime of crimes against Christ and His Church. But is the guilt upon the Papacy? Is the charge proven by facts in its history, or by its present attitude towards the interests of religion and of humanity?

No truer and more convincing presentation, from Scripture and early Christian history, of the divine institution of the Papacy could be wished for than that which is given by Professor Briggs. I thank him, in the name of the Papacy, for his brilliant and learned argumentation. According to the Professor, this much is established beyond all reasonable doubt: that "all attempts to explain 'the rock' in any other way than as referring to Peter have ignominiously failed"; that the texts, "Strengthen thy brethren," "Feed my lambs, feed my sheep," conferred most certainly upon Peter authority over his fellow Apostles. The sayings of Jesus, the Professor continues to argue, are confirmed by the history of the Apostolic age. "Peter was the chief of the Apostles, according to all the Gospels, during the early life of our Lord. The early chapters of 'Acts' represent him as the acknowledged chief of the Apostolic community down to the Council of Jerusalem." The Council of Jerusalem itself, the Professor adds, decided for Peter as against Paul. And, what is most important for the defence of the Papacy, the Professor writes: "It is evident that Jesus, in speaking to St. Peter, had the whole history of His Kingdom in view. . . . It is, therefore, vain to suppose that we must limit the commission to St. Peter. We could no more do that than we could limit the Apostolic commission to the Apostles." And, as to the testimony of early Christian history, what could be more significant than the Professor's words: "We shall have to admit that the Christian Church from the earliest times recognized the primacy of the Roman Bishops. . . . When the whole case has been carefully examined and all the evidence sifted, the statement of Irenæus stands firm: 'It is a matter of necessity that every Church should agree with this Church [the Church of Rome] on account of its pre-eminent authority.'"

So far, I desire no more forcible defender of the Papacy than Professor Briggs himself. But now comes the parting of the ways. The Professor fails to grasp the full meaning and intent of the texts of Scripture which he quotes in favor of the Papacy. According to him, the Pope, the successor of St. Peter, is merely

the Executive Head of the Church, not its Supreme Ruler; legislative and judicial functions are not among the inherent rights of the Papacy, and are best exercised by other organisms within the Church.

The Pope is what Peter was; and Peter was supreme in his leadership. The words of Christ establishing the primacy established the supremacy. "I will give unto thee the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in Heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in Heaven." Peter holds the keys of the Kingdom: he is the absolute master. Whatsoever he binds is bound; whatsoever he looses is loosed: his power extends over the whole sphere of the Kingdom, over all its activities; it is shortened by no power or rights confided to others. Plainly, Peter is legislator and judge, no less than Executive Head. Again: "Simon, Simon, Satan has asked to have you that he might sift you as wheat; but I made supplication for thee, that thy faith fail not: and do thou, when thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren." The whole Apostolic College will be tempted by Satan. But for one only (Simon) is supplication made; to one only (Simon) is the command given to strengthen the brethren. Do not the words, "strengthen thy brethren," give to Peter the Supremacy over the other apostles? Do they not give to Peter—to Peter apart from the others—all power necessary to carry into effect the trust, whatever the form into which it may be required to cast itself, legislative, judicial or merely executive? And again: "Feed my lambs, feed my sheep." The whole flock, the entire Church, disciples and Apostles, are put into the hands of Peter, to be (in the significant expression of the original Greek) "shepherdized" by him. Is the shepherd of the flock merely the Executive Head of lambs or of sheep? Is he not supreme guide and leader, judge and legislator? Is he not the absolute master?

The Professor equally misapprehends the facts and teachings of early Christian ages. In those ages, the Papacy never appears as the mere Executive. Its functions are legislative and judicial, as well as executive. Before A.D. 325, no Œcumenical Council had been held; whatever the general powers exercised in the government of the Church, they were solely the appurtenances of the Bishop of Rome. In A.D. 189, Victor, of himself, ordered the

Bishops of Asia to follow the Roman custom in the celebration of Easter; and, when Irenæus of Lyons expostulated with him in favor of greater clemency of action, it was by way of prayer, not by a denial of his authority. Victor was supreme—legislator, judge and executive. So, too, was it, A.D. 259, with Dionysius of Rome, when he summoned Dionysius, Bishop of Alexandria, to explain his utterances regarding the Second Person of the Trinity; and so, again, was it, A.D. 254, with Stephen, whom Cyprian of Carthage solicited to send to the Bishops of Gaul a command for the deposition of Marcianus, Bishop of Arles.

In its claims that primacy means supremacy, the “real Papacy,” surely, does not depart from the “ideal Papacy”—the Papacy of Scripture and of early ecclesiastical history.

Nor is the Professor correct in the idea which he forms to himself of the Papacy as the centre of Christian unity. He holds to three elements of unity—the Papacy, the ministry and the people—and he would have us believe that, while unity may be impaired, it is not destroyed, so long as even one of those elements remains unbroken. He maintains that, however important the element of the Papacy may be, ministers and people, refusing to accept as valid its later developments—the supremacy—and keeping themselves aloof from it because of those developments, cannot be regarded as violating unity. If such to-day do not take active part in unity with the Papacy, the Papacy itself, the Professor declares, must bear the blame.

Supremacy was vested in the original Papacy; consequently, there is no excuse for those who remain aloof from the Papacy, under the plea that supremacy, as is now claimed, is a late development, void of validity.

That there is in Christian unity a threefold element is true in a sense. The Papacy, the ministry, the people, make up the Church; the Papacy cannot be thought of without ministers and without people, any more than in any organism the head can be thought of without members. But that a portion of the ministry, or a portion of the people, cut off from the Papacy, can still hold that they are within the lines of Christian unity, is no more conceivable than would be the claim that certain members, separated from the head and trunk, no longer deriving from the head the current of life and motion, are still parts of the physical organism. Union with the head is the vital condition of organic unity,

as truly in moral entities as in physical entities. The Pope is the Head of the Church: they who are separated from the Pope are separated from the Church.

Is not this the doctrine of Scripture? If Peter holds the keys, no one is within who has not entered at his opening. If Peter is the rock upon which the Church is built, no one is a stone in the superstructure who does not rest upon him. If Peter is the shepherd, no one is of the flock who is not "shepherdized" by him. If Peter it is who strengthens, no one is strengthened over whom his hand is not raised. Is not this the testimony of early ecclesiastical history? "It is a matter of necessity," wrote Irenæus, "that every Church should agree with this Church" (that of Rome). "Where Peter is," Ambrose declared, "there is the Church." "Following no chief but Christ," wrote Jerome to Damasus, "I am joined in communion with your Holiness, that is, with the Chair of St. Peter."

I am speaking, of course, not of "the soul of the Church," the invisible union of the personal soul with God, of which the invisible God is alone the judge; but of the visible body of the Church, as Christ constituted it among men, to which all must belong if they obey Christ's words—"Hear the Church"; which lives and moves among men, according to the organic laws of its visible being. Of this visible body all must be members, invincible ignorance alone excusing, if they are to be members of Christ; and the condition of membership in this visible body is union with the Pope, the successor of Peter.

No other line of unity, whether that of the people, or that of the ministry, will or can suffice. Priests and bishops they may be, validly ordained, deriving their sacred character from Christ through Apostolic succession; yet, they are not of the Church, unless they are with Peter, and of Peter. Away from Peter, they are in rebellion against the Chieftain of the army, the Shepherd of the flock; they are outside the army, outside the fold. Novatians and Donatists were not without validly ordained priests and bishops; yet neither Novatians nor Donatists were viewed as members of the Church; nor were their bishops admitted to seats in its legislative assemblies. Away from Peter, away from the Church—this was ever the law of early Christian history.

Professor Briggs must widen his "ideal Papacy"; he must do so on his own principles of loyalty to the Papacy of Scripture

and of tradition. And as he widens his "ideal Papacy," he narrows down, by so much, the compass of faults and pretensions which, he thinks, disfigure the modern Papacy, and which alone, he avers, hold him outside the Communion of the Bishop of Rome.

Divisions arose in Christendom. There was the exodus, first, of Greeks, and, later, of Protestants, from the Roman Communion. If we believe Professor Briggs, the chief fault was with Rome. Both in Orient and in Occident, the separatist movement was, at first, a protest only against Papal usurpation, "with a willingness to recognize all valid, historical and Biblical rights of the Pope": but, later, it was compelled to go farther, and set up "National Churches, entirely apart from any jurisdiction of the Pope." Well, if the protest was aimed at vital conditions in the Papacy, such as those which I have described, the protestants were, decidedly, in the wrong from the beginning, and the protest should never have been made. Were it only against policies and administrative acts, matters in which the Papacy claims no immunity from error, it should have remained a protest; never should it have had separation as its outcome. No one, within the fold of the Papacy, believes or needs to believe that all its policies and administrative acts are above criticism. In this regard there reigns the widest liberty. At times, even, circumstances may be such that criticism becomes a duty — criticism, however, that should always be grave and respectful, as befitting the subject, in presence of exalted authority. At one time, Paul himself withstood Peter: although, whatever may have been for the moment the inopportuneness of the attitude of Peter, he was substantially right, as the ulterior prevalence of his Gentile policy amply proves. But never must criticism go so far as to threaten, or lead to rebellion or separation. Reform may be timely; it may be urgent. It must always, however, be attempted from within; there and there only can it be wholesome and effective: there the Founder of the Church made room for it. Separation is the original sin of Greeks and of Protestants, the guilt of which nothing can cancel, save complete return to unity. In withdrawing from the Papacy, the centre of unity in Christendom, under whatever provocation, real or fictitious, and forming Churches of their own, apart from Communion with the Bishop of Rome, Orientals and Protestants were, decidedly, in the wrong. Neither is the wrong made right by lapse of time. The wrong lasts, so

long as separation lasts. The duty is paramount to undo the wrong and bring separation to an end. Centuries have gone by since the separation: the successors of the first separatists are to-day as much bound to return to the fold as their forebears were bound to have remained within it. Most illogical, most un-Christian is the assumption that men must stay where their forebears put them, however untenable be the ground upon which they find themselves encamped. In matters of conscience and religion, each individual soul gives answer for itself. If the Papacy is of divine command, as Professor Briggs proclaims, the Professor and those who think alike should seek at once the shelter of the Papacy: and there make protest and institute work for reform, if protest and reform are still seen to be conducive to the greater welfare of religion. To protest and to reform within the legitimate lines, liberty will be amply guaranteed.

It were interesting, if space permitted, to look into the history of the Greek, or of the Protestant, exodus, and question how far, in the premises, there was fault with the Papacy, how far there was fault with the separatists themselves. It were no difficult task, I am prepared to say, to show that, in the Orient and in the Occident, the real grounds upon which separation was based lay well outside the bulwarks of the Papacy; that complaints against the Papacy, set forth as justifications, were to a large degree excuses, rather than reasons, for schisms which had elsewhere their inciting causes. In the Orient, the cause was pride and ambition in Photius, first, and, later, in Michael Cærularius, together with an unconquerable jealousy of "Old Rome" in Emperors and courtiers of the "New Rome" on the shores of the Bosphorus; the people, as was usually the case in those ages, merely followed the leaders, whithersoever they were going. In Germany, the preaching of Tetzels and the "*Gravamina*" counted far less, as causes, than the personal waywardness and recklessness of character of Martin Luther, and the political ambition and the inordinate greed of princes and barons. In England, who will say that Henry, obeyed by a servile and self-seeking Parliament, would ever have separated from Rome, if Catherine of Aragon had discreetly gone to her grave? Whether in Constantinople, or in Wittenberg, the Papacy showed itself patient and long-suffering; excommunication was pronounced only when its authority had met with stern defiance, and its representatives had

been refused a hearing, or had suffered open contumely. In England, the breach under Henry was consummated only when Parliament had declared that the Bishop of Rome had no longer any authority in the realm, that all the rights and privileges heretofore claimed by him in spirituals as well as in temporals vested in the King and his successors. Not for twelve years after the Elizabethan Settlement by Act of Parliament did Pius V issue his Bull of excommunication.

Separations took place and went their course. But the Papacy remained. With it were bishops, priests and people, who clung to the "rock"; and these, with the Papacy, constituted the Church. Professor Briggs would have us believe that since the separation, first in the Orient, and, later, in the Occident, the life and the activities of the Church were so impaired that its right to act in a corporate capacity ceased, that it could no longer hold an Œcumenical Council. He writes: "The Roman Catholic Church, after the separation of the Orient, continued to hold Œcumenical Councils down to the present time—twenty-two in all; but, inasmuch as these Councils were limited to bishops, doctors and heads of orders in subjection to Rome, and excluded, especially since the Protestant Reformation, the majority of Christian and Orthodox Churches, they are not regarded as œcumenical, except by the Roman Catholic Church itself." A strange doctrine this—that Christ should have so constructed His Church that during centuries it could, by any manner of means, be reduced to practical lifelessness, unable to perform its chief function, that of teacher and definer of truth, through its chief Pontiff, whether alone or in conjunction with his fellow bishops in Œcumenical Council. A strange doctrine this—that lifelessness in the Church becomes at once a fact, so soon as a number of its ministers or its people cut themselves away from it, for whatsoever cause, to set themselves up into separate and independent jurisdictions. No; Christ made His Church to live and to work in every age, and naught will happen from conscious or unconscious interference on the part of any body of men, be they of the people or of the priesthood, or of the episcopate itself. "Where Peter is, there is the Church." Peter is the head; those with him are the members; and, thus constituted, the Church lives on and works. So was it in all ages. From the beginning there were schisms and heresies. Did those schisms and

heresies suspend the life and activity of the Church? Were heretics and schismatics, with or without bishops, ever represented in early Councils, œcumenical or provincial, after they had formally withdrawn from the Church? Were Nestorian bishops admitted to Chalcedon? So soon as Theodoret, Bishop of Cyrus, once a partisan of Nestorius, made his appearance, the Fathers of Chalcedon cried out that the Canons of the Church forbade the admission of a heretic to the Council; and only when he had made clear his acceptance of the decrees of Nicæa was he permitted to take a seat. Did Donatist bishops sit with Augustine in African episcopal gatherings? Once in open schism, Christians of all degrees, priests or bishops, are outside the Church, take no part in its corporate life, retain no right to invalidate its normal action. And so Tridentine and Vatican Councils, convened since the Protestant Reformation, are as truly œcumenical as were, long before the Reformation, the Councils of Nicæa, Ephesus and Chalcedon; and Professor Briggs, by virtue of his appeal to Scripture and early tradition, is bound to accept all Councils, however many they may be, that the Papacy accepts. With best will on its part, the Papacy cannot exempt him from this obligation without annihilation of its own life.

I now come to points where agreement is easier between the Professor and myself—my task being, in the main, the removal of misconceptions into which he has fallen regarding “the Papacy”—what he persists in calling the “real Papacy,” the Papacy of recent and present times.

“The claims of the Papacy to jurisdiction in civil affairs and to dominion over civic governments”—to those the Professor will not listen. To such claims, fortunately, he is not asked to listen. No claims of the kind are made; the Papacy has no right to make such claims, and does not dream of making them. The two spheres, the temporal and the spiritual, are distinct from each other. In its sphere, the civic government is as independent as is the Papacy in its own. Of course, there may be times when the civic government violates the laws of good morals or of religion, and the Papacy must raise its voice in protest. This, however, is not an encroachment upon the civil or temporal sphere: the Papacy remains within the range of the spiritual, performing one of its direct and immediate duties. Perhaps the Professor has in mind the days of Gregory VII, Alexander III, Innocent

III, when a united Christendom saw in the reigning Pope the Supreme Arbiter of peoples and of monarchs, and willingly invoked his intervention, all the more readily that often, in those days, as the Professor himself admits, naught else than Papal intervention was able to arrest direst evils "threatening humanity and even Christianity itself." But those days are past: other international laws and customs hold sway: the Papacy puts forth no claim over civic affairs or civic rulers.

The Professor objects to a Papal domain in the former states of the Church and the City of Rome, "as impracticable and of no real importance." I am sure Pius X entertains no thought of, no wish for, a Papal domain, such as was once possessed by his predecessors. Very much less will satisfy him. The extent of his claim does not go beyond what the Professor is willing to grant. I quote with unlimited approval the Professor's words: "The Papacy must have a territory in which it may carry on the government of the Church throughout the world outside the jurisdiction of any particular civil government. But a very limited territory, such as the American District of Columbia, would be amply sufficient for that purpose." This, and nothing more, is desired by the reigning Pontiff.

The Professor objects to the claim of the Papacy to determine questions of civil government for Roman Catholic citizens, and, as instances, he refers to Catholic parties in Germany "for the maintenance of so-called Catholic principles," and to the recent Papal action in France relating to the tenure of Church property. My answer is: If purely civil matters are in issue, the Pope has no right whatsoever to give directions to Catholics. Catholics would resent directions of this kind. I think, however, that the Professor will admit that the question changes when issues under consideration are such as to appeal to the religious conscience and to demand solution in the light of religious principles. The issue then would appertain to the spiritual order. Who should refuse to the Chieftain of the Church the right to define what such principles mean, and how they are to be applied? The question under discussion in the great battle-days of the "Centrum" in Germany was the inherent right of the Church to the appointment, according to its own rules and requirements, of its bishops and priests: was not this strictly a matter of religion? In France, the controversy turns on the question whether Church

property shall be held under control of the hierarchy or under that of bodies independent of that control. Is not this, again, a religious question? It is true, as a general proposition, that questions of right to property and of tenure of property fall within the competency of the state. But, underneath this competency, there are always the natural rights of the citizen, which the state dares not overlook; and, among those rights, there is that primary right, freedom of religion. Now, the practice of the Catholic religion calls for temples, for temples under the control of the hierarchy. To refuse to the Church the control of its temples violates the natural rights of every professing Catholic, as it violates the principle of religious liberty of which the Government of France makes loud proclamation. "You are free in this land," the Government says to the Church. "Very well," replies the Church through its authorized spokesman, the Pope; "allow me what is essential to my freedom, temples under my control, subject only to such regulations by the state as are conducive to the public weal, and are required in the name of public order." Monsieur Briand, at the present date, concedes to the Church the right to speak in this manner in the name of religious freedom. Professor Briggs should not be more punctilious in defence of the state in France than its own imperious Minister of Public Worship. By the way, while we are touching upon the French question, is not Professor Briggs at sea regarding the rupture of the Concordat? He writes: "The Pope himself violated the Concordat with France by summoning two French bishops to Rome in spite of the prohibition of the French Government." Where, I ask, in the Concordat is there a denial to the Pope of the right to summon to Rome bishops without the consent of the Government? The Professor, evidently, confounds with the Concordat, to which the Papacy was obligated, the "*Articles Organiques*" of Napoleon, which the Papacy repudiated from the moment of their enactment.

"The claims of the Papacy to determine questions of science and philosophy, of sociology and economics" are, in the Professor's mind, serious obstacles to his journeying towards Rome. But the Papacy claims no right, possesses no right, to determine questions of science and philosophy, of sociology and economics. The realm of the Papacy is faith and morals—that much, and nothing more. The situation changes, of course, when specula-

tion, clothed in the garb of science or philosophy, of sociology or economics, soars into the domain of faith and morals, and challenges the Church within its own sphere. Must not the Church be on guard at its frontiers, lest, under the flag of truth, error be seeking passage? Parleying, at least, there must be. The Church calls for time to consider whether faith and morals are really, and not apparently only, put in jeopardy; and it allows to speculation time to reexamine its groundwork and discover whether it is the proven voice of science and philosophy, of sociology or economics, or merely, as the case often is, a phantasm of the imagination. But, it might here be urged, the Church is at times too meticulous, too exacting, and, occasionally, goes too far in its demands and its prohibitions. Be it so: the treasures in the keeping of the Church are so precious that extreme vigilance must be its rule. Better, by far, now and then, an excess of vigilance than, now and then, a lack of prudent care and forethought. In this light, the recent decision of the Scriptural Commission regarding the authorship of the Pentateuch is quite comprehensible. Perhaps the Professor is a little too confident of his own opinion, that Moses should be eliminated for good from the books that have so long borne his name. Modern criticism has yet to speak its last word in this matter. Nor were certain books recently placed on the Index so plainly innocuous as the Professor would lead us to believe: even to theologians outside the Congregation—and many of those most liberal-minded—those books were far from being free of fatal defects, especially the works of Abbé Loisy. As to whether the Syllabus which, report says, is soon to be given out by Pius X, will prove to be dangerous reactionarism, we should wait until we have read it before giving judgment. Nor will the Syllabus of Pius IX appear to be such a dreadful “intrusion of Papal jurisdiction” as the Professor would have us believe, when, in our perusal of it, we give due weight to the circumstances determining the original pronouncement of each separate article, and gather from those circumstances its meaning and intent. Cardinal Newman’s letter to the Duke of Norfolk will, I opine, free the Professor’s mind from apprehension on this score.

“There can be no question,” the Professor says, “of the right of the Pope to determine all ecclesiastical questions as regards marriage and divorce for Roman Catholic citizens; or of the

right of Roman Catholic citizens to organize parochial schools with religious instruction after their own mind; but any interference by the Pope, directly or indirectly, with such questions when under debate by modern governments cannot be less than a misuse of Papal jurisdiction." Here the Professor is most generous in his concession of rights to Pope and to Catholic citizens as regards marriage, divorce and parochial schools; no Catholic should strive to be more so. As to Papal interference with such questions when under debate by modern governments—I should be made conversant more than I now am with each and every one of the cases which the Professor has in mind before I could offer a pertinent reply. Modern governments differ so much in the laws they propose that no general observation of mine could serve the purpose. This much, however, I know full well—that, in our own country, where creeds abound, where each creed has its own norm of faith and morals, Pope and Catholics make no opposition to the Government in its efforts to secure general peace and general contentment by methods and transactions which often are below ideal principles, which, however, are imperiously imposed by existing circumstances.

Other points raised by the Professor scarcely need to be discussed. They are of minor importance; the solution is merely a question of expediency; and, whether inside or outside the Church, the Professor will be free to debate them, without the slightest peril of censure from Pope or Catholics.

That Œcumenical Councils should be more frequent—it is possible. Good comes from such gatherings, where bishops from every clime under the sun raise their voice to offer suggestion and counsel. However, in practice, it is not so easy a task as Professor Briggs may imagine to bring from their homes, "every three or five years," a thousand bishops, so many of them removed from Rome by wide expanse of continent and of ocean, and hold them together in one place, be it the largest of cities, during the weeks and months needed for mutual deliberation. Nor are Œcumenical Councils so necessary that the Pontiff be informed of the needs of religion the world over. Provincial councils, episcopal visitations *ad limina*, modern facilities of correspondence, accomplish much in this regard. Moreover, we must keep in mind the organization of the Church. The Papacy is not the dreadful centralization that it is sometimes reported to be. There

are the Dioceses and the Provinces, where greatest latitude is given to local action, as local interest may require. The organization of the Catholic Church is much as that of the American Republic, with its national and its State governments. However, an occasional Œcumenical Council is profitable; and perhaps the Professor may see one during his lifetime. Meanwhile, it is unfair to say of the Papacy that its reluctance to convoke frequently Œcumenical Councils arises from its wish that no check be put upon its will. There is no warrant whatever for such an accusation.

That the Cardinalate should be more wide-spread over the world; that among Cardinals resident in Rome and forming the Pope's immediate cabinet there might be, with advantage to the general Church, fewer Italians and more foreigners; that, conditions changing with the modern world, the Catholicity of the Church might be more emphasized than it is at present in its central seat of government—on this score the Professor is most free to think as he likes, to urge, as he chooses, his views upon the Papacy. However, he must agree with me that time is needed before changes from existing policies can be prudently made, all the more so that those policies are of ancient date, and had in the past, as they may have in the present, good reasons in their favor.

That the Pope need not, always and ever, be an Italian—of course not; many Popes in the past were not Italians. One who is not an Italian may in the not distant future be enthroned in the Vatican. For my part, however, I do not easily see that, in these days of international jealousies and fears, such a happening would be an omen of greater international peace than the Church now enjoys. It is wisdom, perhaps, to leave things as they are. Nor does the Pope, ever and always, need to reside in Rome. The Popes, for a long time, resided in Avignon. Yet who does not see that Rome, the Capital of Christendom from earliest ages, the city of the martyrdom of Peter and Paul, the central seat of Papal memories and glories for nineteen centuries, is the native home of the Papacy through the will of Providence, no less than through the will of the Church? To what city, other than Rome, would the Catholics of the world bid the Pope to go? Not to Paris, not to Berlin, not to London, not even to Washington. Rome is the city of the Catholic heart and of the Catholic faith:

be it ever the city of the Popes! And if a resident of Rome, why should the Pope not be the Bishop of Rome, as well as Bishop Universal? Is not the national government fittingly the sole civil government in Washington? So the Pope is, most fittingly, the sole episcopal authority in Rome.

Is the Papacy an obstacle to the reunion of Christendom? Is there sufficient justification for Professor Briggs, holding, as he does, as he must, in loyalty to Scripture and tradition, to an "ideal Papacy," to remain aloof from the "real Papacy"? There is none. The "real Papacy," in all its principles, is the Papacy of Scripture and tradition, the "ideal Papacy"; and seen in action, yesterday and to-day, stripped of clouds gathered over its brow by prejudice and misconception, it looms up in Christendom still the "ideal Papacy," so far as the ideal can be realized through human elements. Christ did not, in instituting it, promise to manifest Himself in its every word, in its every measure. He appointed men to be His Vicars; and while, in the interest of truth, He guards their official utterances, He does not guarantee supreme wisdom in all their administrative acts. Yet, even in the human work of the Papacy, along its many centuries of life, so much wisdom is noticeable that men wonder at its grandeur, and easily confess that, through its human elements, there shines a supernatural radiance, a reflection from the divinity of its inner soul, which is Christ, the Founder of the Church.

Whatever can be done to bring about reunion, the Papacy is most willing to do. It will not change the vital principles of its being. The Professor will not, on second thought, ask it to do this. For then it were not the Papacy, as instituted by Christ; and the Professor, assuredly, covets none other. The Papacy must maintain that primacy means supremacy, since supremacy was the Lord's appointment; it must maintain that the Pope cannot reduce himself to be merely the Executive Head of the Church, since he is from Christ the Supreme Ruler; it cannot in its Councils put on the same level priests and bishops, however validly ordained, who persist in schism, though it may invite them to argument and explanation, as Leo invited the Orientals to the Vatican Council, as Clement VII and Paul III invited the Lutherans of Germany to the Tridentine; it cannot repudiate as non-œcumenical those Councils which were held since the Greek Schism, or the Protestant "Reformation"—these Councils were

valid Councils of the Church; the Church, after the separation as before, lived with fulness of power and authority, with rights unimpaired. Nor is the dream, apparently the most dear to the Professor, to be realized—that a Constitution be framed defining and limiting the authority of the Papacy, adjoining to it with independent powers a representative Council of Bishops to whom should belong all legislative functions, and another body, equally independent, that should take to itself judicial functions. Christ, once for all, gave a Constitution to the Papacy—that it be supreme; the Constitution given by Christ no Pope, no body of Bishops can alter. Counsellors the Pope will gather around him; vicars and delegates he will have, to divide with him the labor of his office; but the Supreme Master, in last resort, he will ever remain.

Claims of the Papacy to be what Christ made it will not be an obstacle to reunion for those who sincerely seek to know the Papacy, as Christ established it. Other obstacles, enumerated by the Professor, have no existence in fact, or, at best, refer to trifling questions of mere human expediency, to which no serious mind will pay attention when the great duty is remembered to withdraw from schism and seek shelter within the fold where the Master's prayer is fulfilled, that "they be one"—"one fold and one shepherd."

JOHN IRELAND.